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of the successors in interest of the covenantee, and not merely in gross.40
The few cases decided in North Carolina seem to contemplate the
existence of both a dominant and a servient tenement, and at least one
case has held that the covenant so creating the easement must conform
to public policy.50 The North Carolina court has expressed no opinion
as to whether the covenant would be objectionable if it interfered with
alienation, and has had no occasion to decide whether the dominant
tenement must be described with particularity; whether the dominant
tenement must receive substantial benefit from the easement created;
nor whether the dominant and servient tenements must be contiguous.
There is, however, no indication that the North Carolina court would
find itself in disagreement with these requirements, which have been
dealt with in other jurisdictions, if the question were properly presented.
Regarded in the light of the foregoing discussion, the decision in the
principal case does not seem to be out of line with the holdings of the
majority and the court seems to have adhered to the principles announced
in earlier cases in North Carolina.
WILLIAM C. MORRIS, JR.
Labor Law-Arbitration in North Carolina
Arbitration, as a means of settling commercial and property disputes
without resort to the judicial system, was authorized by statute in colo-
nial North Carolina' and was commonly used, as shown by the number
of cases which reached the Supreme Court, in the early days of state-
hood.2 However, it was not until two hundred years after the first
"Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 598, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
o Covenant was held to create an easement running with the lands, and bind-
ing upon a subsequent purchaser in fee. The court added: "This decision is limited
to a case in principle like this: Where the intent to create an easement is clear,
where the easement is apparent, and where the covenant is consistent with public
policy, and so qualifies or regulates the mode of enjoying the easement, that if it be
disregarded, the easement created will be substantially different from that in-
tended." (Italics added.) Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1, 17 (1870).
' Laws of 1749, North Carolina, "An Act for determining Differences by Arbi-
tration," adopting the English statute, 9 & 10 William III c. 15 (1698). 23 CLARK,
STATE REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA 325 (1904). This statute is no longer in
force. Simpson v. McBee, 14 N. C. 531 (1832).
2 Compare the number of arbitration cases in recent volumes with the fact that
eight cases between 1795 and 1801 are reported in the first three volumes of the
North Carolina reports. Early subject matters included disputes over land bound-
aries, a horse, and partnership accounts. It is difficult, however, to differentiate
early cases of court rules of reference by consent and voluntary ex curia arbi-
tration.
The rudimentary condition of the courts may have accounted for much early
resort to arbitration. Not until 1806 was there a superior court for each county.
Until 1818 there was _no separate supreme court. Adams, Evolutlo,; of Law in
North Carolina, 2 N. C. L. REv. 133, 138 (1924). In 1846, Governor Graham still
longed for a time when "all Law suits could 'be ended in one, or at most two
years from their commencement, instead of being, as they often are, transmitted
from father to son." JonNsoN, ANTE BE.LUm NORTH CAROLINA 638 (1937).
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colonial statute that the North Carolina Supreme Court dealt with its
first case of arbitration of a labor-management dispute.3
Trade-union organization reached North Carolina as early as 1854,
4
but unionization of basic industry was not sufficient for labor arbitration
to warrant attention until the nineteen-thirties. 5 Increased organization
of labor and the work of the War Labor Board 6 during World War II
were key stimuli in the development of the current and widespread resort
to arbitration as a peaceful device for the settlement of industrial griev-
ances, 7 notwithstanding that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are
' Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 233 N. C.
46, 62 S. E. 2d 535 (1950). Employer moved to vacate an award made by the
majority of a board of arbitration on the ground that the award was not within
the scope of the agreement. Employer had signed submission and participated in
hearing. Held: the award, interpreting holiday and overtime provisions, was within
the terms of the agreement and arbitrators had not exceeded their powers. Judg-
ment directing employer to comply therewith affirmed.
Cf. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 143 F. 2d 1015
(4th Cir. 1944) (decision governed by federal railway labor statute).
'The Raleigh typographical union was organized in that year. 7th ANN.
REPORT, N. C. BUREAU OF LABOR & PRINTING 118 et seq. (1894). Mechanics'
associations, forerunners of modern trade unions, were formed as early as 1795 in
Wilmington and Fayetteville. JOHNSON, ANrE BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA 174
(1937). The Knights of Labor had extensive organization in the state during the
1880's. MITCHELL, TEXTILE UNIONISM AND THE SOUTH C. 2 (1931). In 1900 there
were 82 known labor organizations in the state. 14th ANN. REPORT, N. C. BUREAU
OF LABOR & PRINTING 388-91 (1901). Chief Justice Clark addressed labor meet-
ings, frequently contributed articles to the AFL's "American Federationist," and
served as a National War Labor Board umpire during World War I. 2 BROOKS
AND LEFLER, THE PAPERS OF WALTER CLARK 191, 366, 439 (1950).
'Douty, Labor Unrest in North Carolina, 1932, 11 SOCIAL FORCES 579 (1933).
'UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, AaRTRaATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 36-38 (1946);
Comment, 40 ILL. L. REv. 526 (1946). Cf. Braden, Problems in Labor Arbitra-
tion, 13 Mo. L. REv. 143, 164 (1948).
" It is estimated that some 250 collective bargaining contracts are in effect in
North Carolina. State Department of Labor arbitrators handle some 25 cases
a year, although this agency is being more frequently named in contracts. Letter
to writer from Forrest H. Shuford, North Carolina Commissioner of Labor, Ra-
leigh, North Carolina, April 19, 1951.
In the course of interviews with arbitrators in the field, it was learned that the
Charlotte, North Carolina office of the American Arbitration Association is
currently handling an annual volume of 100-125 labor arbitrations. It is under-
stood that the A.A.A. conducted several hundred labor arbitrations in North and
South Carolina during the last five years, but only one commercial arbitration.
In the 15-month period ending March, 1951, the Federal Mediation & Con-
ciliation Service nominated or appointed arbitrators in 224 cases in 15 Southern
and border states (including Maryland, West Virginia, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
and the District of Columbia, but not including Kentucky). For the same period
the national case-load was 870. Approximately 12 cases were in North Carolina.
The oil industry, which made the predominant use of the Service in the Southern
region, prefers direct appointments by the agency, a rather rare procedure, rather
than the usual nomination of panels from which the parties select the arbitrator.
Letter to writer from J. W. Greenwood, Jr., Associate Director, Federal Media-
tion & Conciliation Seriice, Washington, D. C., April 26, 1951.
These statistics of impartial agencies in no way indicate the frequency with
which the parties mutually agree upon an individual arbitrator and proceed to a
hearing. On the basis of interviews with arbitrators, it is indicated that at least
an additional 25% in case volume thus takes place in this region. The Cone Mills
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not judicially enforceable. 8
A survey will first be made of some aspects of the law of commercial
arbitration which comprises the common law that is applied, however in-
advisedly,9 to labor arbitration. This will be followed by an examination
of local contractual practices in respect to labor arbitration. Lastly, pos-
sible means of enforcement, taking into account the 1951 revision of the
North Carolina labor arbitration statute,' 0 will be dealt with.
The North Carolina court early recognized the desirability of com-
mercial and property arbitration, finding that it determines the dispute
"in an amicable and friendly manner,"" avoids "the rigorous applica-
tion of the rules of construction . . . [with the] endless subtlety of refine-
ment" in the law, and adjusts 'the controversies of men before a do-
mestic tribunal,' 2 unattended with expense, trouble or delay."' "The
policy of the law is in favor of settlements by arbitrators' 4 . . ." who
"are not bound to decide upon mere dry principles of law, but may
decide upon principles of equity and good conscience."' 15 Justice Seawell
declared that it is
"the policy of the law and the care of the courts to liberally sus-
tain this very effectual and valuable method of bringing con-
and TWUA-CIO are reported to agree upon arbitrators almost uniformly without
recourse to the contractual clause providing for impartial selection in event of a
deadlock.
Additional cases arise under contracts which provide for a permanent, named
arbitrator.
' Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 233 (1950); Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678 (1948). The Uniform
Arbitration Act, N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-544 et seq., is limited to existing disputes.
For an interesting summary of the North Carolina law where the contract pro-
vided for New York commercial arbitration, probably in order to avoid local legal
uncertainties, see Gantt v. Hurtado & Cia, Ltd., 297 N. Y. 433, 79 N. E. 2d 815
(1948). Quaere: is the scarcity of commercial arbitrations in the region, indicated
in footnote 7, supra, to be partially explained by such evasions? In any event, such
device would not be practical in labor arbitration.
'Judge-made common law rules* were "intended to throttle a technique that
society found useful." Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitra-
tion. Agreements, 17 U. OF CH. L. REv. 233, 238 (1950). Commercial arbitration
law and procedure "consists of confused, technical and contradictory doctrines."
6 WrLLISTOx, CONTRACrS §1929A (Rev. Ed. 1938).
10 C. 1103, N. C. 1951 Sess. Laws, rewriting N. C. GEN. STAT. §95-36.1 (1943)
et seq." Bryant v. Miller, 1 N. C. 398 (1801).
12 Borretts v. Patterson, 1 N. C. 126 (1799) ; Devereux v. Burgwin, 33 N. C.
490 (1850) ("judges of the parties' own choosing")." Borretts v. Patterson, I N. C. 126 (1799); Copney v. Parks, 212 N. C.
217, 193 S. E. 21 (1937) ("simple and speedy method"); Leach v. Harris, 69
N. C. 532 (1873) ("cheap and speedy").
Robbins v. Killebrew, 95 N. C. 19, 23 (1886) ; Hurdle v. Stallings, 109 N. C.
6, 13 S. E. 720 (1891) ("arbitration is looked upon with great favor by the
courts").
1 "Robbins v. Killebrew, 95 N. C. 19, 23 (1886) ; Pierce v. Perkins, 17 N. C.
250 (1832) (decision "according to right, and not according to law . . . influenced
by all moral and equitable considerations").
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troversies to an end, considering that in many instances the
controversy may have a more friendly ending and a speedier
determination, and even a greater probability of justice between
the litigants than may be afforded by the more belligerent meth-
ods of trial in the courts of law."
'16
Despite this sympathetic attitude, the North Carolina court has
considered itself bound by the common law doctrine of the revocability
of arbitration agreements.' 7 Since a dictum by Lord Coke in 1609,1s
the prevailing rule has been that either party may revoke his
agreement to arbitrate at any time prior to the rendering of the award.
Yet the breach of the agreement to arbitrate calls for damages,' 9 and
once the arbitration has been completed, the award may be recovered
in an action at law20 or specifically enforced in equity.
21
This anomalous situation22 by which the specific performance of
agreements to arbitrate is denied 23 has been deplored by learned judges
24
M 1 Bryson v. Higdon, 222 N. C. 17, 20, 21 S. E. 2d 836, 837 (1942). In Clark
Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 160 N. C. 130, 140, 75 S. E.
944, 949 (1912), the Court laid down these "well-settled principles": Arbitrators
"are not bound to decide according to law, when acting within the scope of their
authority, being the chosen judges of the -parties and a law unto themselves, but
may award according to their notions of justice and without assigning any rea-
son. . . . The policy of the law favors settlements by arbitration and, therefore,
leans liberally and partially towards them, extending its favor in support of this
amicable method of settlement." See Leach v. Harris, 69 N. C. 532 (1873) ("lib-
erally construed . . . without regard to technicalities or refinement").
" Brown v. Moore, 229 N. C. 406, 50 S. E. 2d 5 (1948) ; Tarpley v. Arnold,
226 N. C. 679, 40 S. E. 2d 33 (1946). Earliest dictu was in Norfleet v. Southall,
7 N. C. 189 (1819). See Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co., 153 N. C. 7, 68 S. E.
902 (1910), regarded as the leading case. Cf. Gantt v. Hurtado & Cia, Ltd., 297
N. Y. 433, 79 N. E. 2d 815 (1948).
" Vynior's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 302 (K. B. 1609).
"' See Wynne v. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co., 179 N. C. 320, 102 S. E. 403
(1920) ; STURGES, COMMERCIAL AmITRATIONS AND AWNARDs §§22, 84 (1930).
0 Copney v. Parks, 212 N. C. 217, 193 S. E. 21 (1937) ; Metcalf v. Guthrie,
94 N. C. 447 (1886); Simpson v. McBee, 19 N. C. 229 (1837).
2 Thompson v. Dean, 59 N. C. 22 (1860) ("the' submission and award, to-
gether, amounted to an agreement . . . plainly executory in its nature. . . . The
enforcement of such an agreement, specifically, is a familiar subject of equity
jurisdiction."). And see Metcalf v. Guthrie, 94 N. C. 447 (1886); Crawford v.
Orr, 84 N. C. 246 (1881).
2" This is especially true in the labor field, where collective bargaining contracts
commonly base the no-strike, no-lockout clause on the very availability of griev-
ance and arbitration procedures. The union's right to strike is preserved on matters
"not subject to arbitration." AGREEMENT BETWEEN ERWmI MILLs, INC., AND TEX-
TILE WORxERS UNION OF A~mIcA-CIO (Erwin, N. C., Oct. 11, 1950) Art. X,
p. 25. See N.L.R.B. v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F. 2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) where
findings of the employer's unfair labor practices were over-ruled because the union,
even in the absence of a no-strike clause, could not strike where grievance pro-
cedures were provided.
"' See Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290 (1911).
" Cardozo, J. in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288
(1921); Hough, J. in U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (D. C., N. Y. 1915); Frank, J. in Kulukundis Shipping Co.
v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 982-985 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; Judge Allen
in Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911), re-
viewed older criticism of the common law rule in other jurisdictions.
1951]
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and overturned by statutes2 5 or judicial holdings20 in many states.
Various arguments have been offered to justify the common law doc-
trine: that arbitration agreements are inherently revocable ;27 that they
"oust the jurisdiction" of the courts28 and are against the interest of
judges;29 that they are against public policy.3 0 On the other hand,
agreements to arbitrate labor disputes are today everywhere encour-
aged.3 1 The North Carolina court has now adopted this favorable view
as to labor arbitrations,3 2 a policy asserted by statute since 1945.38
The Uniform Arbitration Statute, adopted in North Carolina in
1927,34 applies only to agreements to arbitrate already existing disputes
-making these enforceable and irrevocable. 85 The statutory method
has been construed as being concurrent with, and not exclusive of, the
common law method of arbitration.38 Since labor arbitration is generally
based on an agreement to submit future disputes arising during the
contract term, this statute has been of no aid.8 7 The 1951 revision of
the North Carolina labor arbitration act3 8 provides:
"5 Statutory situation surveyed in CooK's CASES oN EQuiTY 456 (4th Ed. 1948);
Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U.
oF CHi. L. REV. 233, 238-242 (1950) ; Note, 43 ILL. L. R'v. 678 (1948).
"Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn. 182, 296
N. W. 475, 135 A. L. R. 59 (1941) ; Ezell v. Rocky Mtn. Bean and Elevator Co.,
76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 680 (1925).
27 Vynior's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 302 (K. B. 1609).
.'Originating in Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (1746). See Williams v. Bran-
ning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290 (1911) ; Kelly v. Trimont Lodge, 154
N. C. 97, 69 S. E. 764 (1910). Termed "a quaint explanation" in Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 983 (2nd Cir. 1942).
2" Judicial competition for fees was ascribed as the original reason for the
doctrine by Lord Campbell in Scott v. Avery, 25 L. J. Ex. 308, 313 (1855)
("a great scramble in Westminster Hall for the division of the spoil .... jealously
of arbitrations"). Noted as a possible motive in Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911).
"See Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137 S. E. 869 (1927) ; Nelson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911).
"See §108 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. §101 et
seq. (1947) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.
S. 50 (1944); Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn.
182, 296 N. W. 475, 135 A. L. R. 59 (1941); Note, 28 N. C. L. REV. 225, 228
(1950).
" Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 233 N. C.
46, 62 S. E. 2d 535 (1950).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §§95-36.1 to 95-36.7 (1950), as revised by c. 1103, 1951
N. C. Sess. Laws.
"1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-544 to 1-567 (1943). See Sturges, Arbitration uinder
the New North Carolina Arbitration Statute-the Uniform Arbitration Act, 6
N .C. L. REv. 363 (1928).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §1-544 (1943).
"Copney v. Parks, 212 N. C. 217, 193 S. E. 2d 21 (1937).
Although nearly all labor disputes are arbitrated under written submission
agreements, few of these would bring themselves within the statutory terms so
as to be irrevocable. Cf. Andrews v. Jordan, 205 N. C. 618, 172 S. E. 319 (1934)
which seems to require, in order for the statute to be applicable, that the sub-
mission agreement expressly invoke the statute.
"C. 1103, 1951 N. C. Sess. Laws (§§95-36.1 to 95-36.10).
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"Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Award. (a)
Written agreements to arbitrate labor disputes, including but
not restricted to controversies relating to wages, hours and other
conditions of employment, shall be valid, enforceable and irrev-
ocable, except upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for
the rescission or revocation of any contract, in either of the fol-
lowing cases:
"(i) Where there is a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement or any other contract, hereafter made or extended,
for the settlement by arbitration of a controversy or contro-
versies thereafter arising between the parties;
"(ii) Where there is an agreement to submit to arbitration
a controversy or controversies already existing between the
parties.
"(b) Any arbitration award, made pursuant to an agreement
of the parties described in subsection (a) of this Section and in
accordance with this Article shall be final and binding upon the
parties to the arbitration proceedings."
The Act applies only to voluntary agreements to arbitrate labor dis-
putes, including, but not restricted to, controversies respecting wages,
hours and other conditions of employment. The statutory purpose is to
enable the parties to carry on labor arbitration according to the terms
of their own agreement, the Act specifically refraining from imposing
statutory terms insofar as the contract provides otherwise on such
matters as rules of procedure, fees, selection of arbitrators, and time
limits. In addition to making agreements to arbitrate enforceable, the
General Assembly strengthened the role of the state Department of
Labor through the panel of arbitrators, in the labor arbitration process
in North Carolina.
At least four out of every five collective bargaining contracts now
provide for some sort of arbitration.3 9 A study of arbitration provisions
in 71 current or very recent contracts in the South4" indicates some of
the prevailing practices. The vast bulk of labor arbitration in the region
is concerned with disposition of grievances arising during a collective
bargaining agreement.41 Typically, arbitration is the terminal step of a
"Arbitration Provisions in Union Agreements in 1949, 70 MONTHLY LAB. R1v.
160 (1950). Of 1,482 contracts analyzed, 83 percent provided for arbitration. For
its local significance, this survey indicates that in the textile industry such pro-
visions are most frequent, while in the tobacco industry less than half of the
contracts have arbitration clauses.
4" The sample studied by the writer consisted of 30 North Carolina contracts,
14 from South Carolina, 7 each from Georgia and Tennessee, 6 each from Virginia
and Alabama, and one covering several Southern states. Industrially, 42 were in
textile, 7 in auto, steel or metals, 4 each in paper and hosiery, 3 each in chemicals,
transportation and furniture, and 5 from scattered industries. Over 100 separate
plants and local unions were covered, with all branches of organized labor
represented.
" All the contracts studied provided for grievance arbitration. Only four had
clauses indicating the possibility of wage or contract-term arbitration. Over one-
half of the contracts specifically excluded wages from the arbitration provision.
1951]
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grievance procedure which commences with the employee or union
steward taking the disputed matter up with the foreman, and with its
being intermediately referred, if necessary, to successively higher levels
of union and management personnel for bilateral settlement.
A majority of the contracts studied provide for the use of a 3-man
board of arbitration.4 2 Forty-five percent of the contracts provide for
a single arbitrator.4 3 These generally contemplate ad hoc arrange-
ments for each case. In only four contracts were individuals designated
by name to serve for the entire contract period.4 4 Provision is usually
made for the use of an impartial agency in resolving a deadlock in the
selection of the single arbitrator, or the "neutral" third member of the
board.4 5 Nationally, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is
most commonly used.4 6 While thirty percent of the Southern contracts
name the federal Service, over one-half resort to a private agency, the
American Arbitration Association. 47 A few in North Carolina refer
to the state Commissioner of Labor.
42 However, of the 39 contracts which provided for a tripartite board, 7
permitted a single arbitrator if the parties so agreed in particular cases. One
contract set up a 5-man board with two appointees each by the employer and
the union. AGREEMENT, MEAD CORP. AND UNITED PAPERWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO
(Lynchburg, Va., Sept. 16, 1948) Art. X (3), p. 14.
"'Few of the 32 contracts providing for 1-man arbitration were outside of
the textile and hosiery industries.
"95% of the contracts provided for ad hoc arbitration. It is worth noting
that the permanent arrangements were generally at plants where collective bar-
gaining had been established for some years. In practice, parties with written
ad hoc provisions may occasionally have informal understandings whereby a certain
individual is appointed regularly.
a board of three arbitrators, one to be appointed by the Company, one
to be appointed by the Union, and a third to be designated by the American Arbi-
tration Association." AGREEMENT, THOMASVILLE CHAIR Co. AND UNITED FURNI-
TURE WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO (Thomasville, N. C., Sept. 16, 1950) Art. V.
§1, p. 11. An unusual provision is for two agencies to make the selection. "...
the parties shall endeavor to select an arbiter. Should they be unable to mutually
agree within twenty-four hours, then either party may apply to the Director of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the Commissioner of Labor
of the State of North Carolina, who shall . . . be jointly authorized to promptly
furnish such impartial arbiter." AGREEMENT, HIGHLAND COTTON MILLS AND TEX-
TILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (High Point, N. C., June 9, 1949) §IV
(a), p. 7.
" Arbitration. Provisions in Union Agreements in 1949, 70 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
160, 164 (1950). However, this study showed that the largest group of contracts,
37% of those analyzed, failed to provide any predetermined method of breaking
a deadlock over selection of an arbitrator. Compare this with the instant Southern
sample which indicated only 3 contracts of the 71 studied without such provisions.
In Warren and Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 IND. & LAm. REL. IV.
200, 206 (1951), it is shown that both employers and unions prefer selection by the
parties themselves as first choice, but that unions, in case of a deadlock, prefer
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation by a four-to-one margin.
"' American Arbitration Association is designated in 39 contracts; the federal
service is named in 21. However, 36 of the A. A. A. clauses are in textile or
hosiery contracts, in which group the federal service is seldom designated. See
KEL.LoR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 176 (1948) (by 1946 there were over 400 A. A. A.
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Agreements generally provide for speedy determinations as planned
by the parties by including strict time limits for selecting the arbi-
trators,4 8 and often by requiring that the hearing and decision take
place within a matter of days.49 All except one5o of the contracts studied
provide that the employer and union share the costs of arbitration. In
the textile industry, special types of arbitration are sometimes provided
for work-load cases as contrasted with ordinary grievances. 51
Usually, contracts limit the arbitrator's authority to the "interpre-
tation and application" of the contract terms.52 Several rigidly restrict
the arbitrator's jurisdiction to specified types of disputes 53 or exclude
clauses in the textile industry). In other industries, the situation conformed more
to the national pattern. See footnote 46, supra. Evidence of compromise, whereby
the A. A. A. and the federal service are the appointing agency for alternate
3-month periods, appear in some contracts. AGREEMENT, W. VA. PULP & PAPER
CO. AND INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF PAPERMAKERS, AFL (Charleston, S. C., July 1,
1948) p. 10.
" Typically, 24 to 72 hours. See footnote 45, smpra,. "Within forty-eight (48)
hours after written demand for arbitration the two parties shall meet and endeavor
to select an arbiter. Should they be unable to mutually agree within twenty-four
(24) hours, then either party may apply" to the impartial agency. AGREEMENT,
JEWEL COTTON MILLS, INC. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO
(Thomasville, N. C., Dec. 9, 1950) §V (a), p. 8.
"9 Decision must be rendered within 5 days of conclusion of hearing. AGREE-
MENT, UNIVERSAL MOULDED PRODUCTS CORP. AND INT'L WOODWORKERS ASS'N,
CIO (Bristol, Va.-Tenn., May 9, 1950) p. 5. Board to meet day after appoint-
ment, and every day thereafter, except Sunday, until decision reached. AGREEMENT,
BIRMINGHAM ELECTRIC CO. AND AMAL. ASS'N, STREET AND ELECTRIC Rwy. EM-
PLOYEES OF AMERICA (Birmingham, Ala., Mar. 28, 1950), p. 2. See Brotherhood
of Rwy. Clerks v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 143 F. 2a 1015 (4th Cir. 1944) ("Time
is of the essence in arbitration at common law . . ."); Long v. Cromer, 181
N. C. 354, 107 S. E. 217 (1921). In practice, stipulations often waive the
specific requirements in order to avoid the potential danger of an invalid award
-if rendered subsequent to the fixed date.
" Losing party shall pay arbitration fees and expenses. AGREEMENT, CLIFTON
MFG. Co. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (Clifton and Con-
verse, S. C., Apr. 25, 1950) p. 10.
"1 On technical matters, a 3-man board; on non-technical questions, a single
arbitrator. AGREEMENT, ERWIN MILLS, INC. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, CIO (Durham, N. C., Oct. 11, 1950) Art. IX(A) (1) (2), pp. 23-24.
On work-load cases, the arbitrator must be: "a competent technician familiar with
time studies," AGREEMENT, FIELDcREST MILLS AND TWUA-CIO (Leaksville-Spray,
N. C., Feb. 28, 1949) p. 18; "firm of qualified industrial engineers," AGREEMENT,
AMERICAN ENKA CORP. AND UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL (Ashe-
ville, N. C., May 26, 1950) Art. XII(B), p. 23; "an arbiter competent in the
field." AGREEMENT, NEWBERRY TEXTILE MILLS AND UTWA-AFL (Newberry, S.
C., Feb. 28, 1948) p. 10. Cf. Norfleet v. Southall, 7 N. C. 189 (1819) (arbitration
"calls for a knowledge of a peculiar kind, and a familiarity with customs and
practices").
'- "... jurisdiction and authority to interpret and apply the provisions of this
agreement . . .no jurisdiction or authority to add to. take from, or modify any of
the terms." AGREEMENT. ERWIN MILLS INC. AND TWUA-CIO (Durham, N. C.,
Oct. 11, 1950) Art. IX(B), p. 24, ". .. all grievances and complaints concerning
violations of or noncompliance with the agreement," GENERAL LABOR RELATIONS
AGREEMENT. REYNOLDS ALLOY CO. AND INTL COUNCIL OF ALUMINUJM WORKERS
UNIONS, AFL (Listerhill, Ala., Apr. 22, 1949) p. 24.
" Listed eight articles to which grievances are limited. AGREEMENT, AMERICAN
BEMBERG AND UTWA-AFL (Elizabethton, Tenn., Sept. 1, 1950) p. 8.
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listed issues from his authority.54 Occasionally, the contract expressly
details factors which must be weighed in reaching the decision.55 The
scope5" of the award, or more commonly, its form, r may be explicitly
limited. In practice, nothing resembling exclusionary rules of evidence
are used at the hearing, 58 and contract clauses may indicate the liberal
procedure desired by the parties.50 Arbitrators often visit the industrial
scene6° to view the performance of a particular job or otherwise to
acquaint themselves directly with the matters at issue.
"'Nearly always excluded in the Southern contracts studied is the question
of a general wage increase or decrease. Compare this with national study showing
only 14% of the contracts specifically excluding the general level of wages from
arbitration. Arbitration Provisions in Union Agreements in 1949, 70 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 160, 162 (1950). Work loads and rates of pay excluded from arbitra-
tion. AGREEMENT, WOODSIDE MILLS AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,
CIO (Greenville, S. C., Mar. 22, 1949) p. 7. All disputes covered except merit
increases and promotions of journeymen machinists. AGREEMENT, WRIGHT'S AUTO-
MATIC MACHINERY CO. AND INT'L ASS'N OF MACHINISTS (Durham, N. C., May 3,
1948) §16, p. 29. See footnote 41, supra.
" "The Board of Arbitration will base its determination of the matter upon
scientific time studies and shall use the procedural methods used by the Corpora-
tion in determining standards and incentive premiums." AGREEMENT, AMERICAN
ENKA CoRP. AND UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL (Asheville, N. C.,
May 26, 1950) Art. XII (B), p. 23. "In making his decision, the arbiter shall
keep in mind the competitive situation. . . ." AGREEMENT AND SHOP RULES, CO-
LUMBIA MILLS CO. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (Columbia,
S. C., Aug. 22, 1949) §6 (b), p. 6.
" "All decisions shall be retroactive to the date the grievance was submitted to
the plant superintendent in writing. . ." AGREEMENT, GOLDEN BELT MFG. CO. AND
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO (Durham, N. C., Mar. 22, 1949)
§3, p. 4. No decision shall extend monetary benefits to an employee beyond 30 days
after notice of arbitration. AGREEMENT AND SHOP RULES, PACIFIC MILLS AND
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA (Columbia, S. C., July 17, 1948) §5(f),
p. 8.
" ,,... shall include his findings of fact and conclusions, shall be in writing...
AGREEMENT, ALEO MFG. Co. AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO
(Rockingham, N. C., Aug. 15, 1949) Art. 9(6), p. 32. In labor arbitration prac-
tice, the awards are nearly always in writing. Compare this with the liberal
common law attitude where the submission is not specific. Ball-Thrash Co. v.
McCormack, 172 N. C. 677, 90 S. E. 916 (1916).
"8 See Singer, Labor Arbitration--Use of Legal Rules of Evidence, 2 LAB. L. J.
185 (1951). Cf. Hurdle v. Stallings, 109 N. C. 6, 13 S. E. 720 (1891) (no power
to arbitrarily decline to receive evidence) ; Pierce v. Perkins, 17 N. C. 250 (1832)
(cannot hear witnesses privately without other party being present.)
" Arbitrators "shall promptly make such investigation, hear such evidence or
testimony and consider such matters as may be material .... Both the Company
and the Union shall be afforded full opportunity to present such evidence as they
may deem necessary, or as the arbiters shall request or demand." AGREEMENT,
CONE MILLS CORP., TABARDREY PLANT AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,
CIO (Haw River, N. C., Dec. 6, 1950) §4(b), p. 6. The right to cross-examine
is sometimes specifically provided for. AGREEMENT, AMERICAN ENKA CORP. AND
UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL (Asheville, N. C., May 26, 1950)
Art. VI(E), p. 12.
"0 Land boundary disputes in common law arbitration frequently called for going
upon the land in controversy. Hemphill v. Gaither, 180 N. C. 604, 105 S. E. 183
(1920); Hurdle v. Stallings, 109 N. C. 6, 13 S. E. 720 (1891); Thompson v.
Deans, 59 N. C. 22 (1860).
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The contract may require that the arbitrator have certain personal
qualifications such as technical experience 61 or residence. 2 An analysis
of the North Carolina Department of Labor's current twenty-member
voluntary arbitration panel0 3 gives some indication of the type of indi-
viduals engaged as arbitrators. 64 College professors, comprising fifteen
members of the panel, handle nearly all the cases; only four members
are practicing attorneys. 65
If one party to a collective bargaining contract which provides for
arbitration of future disputes refuses to arbitrate, specific performance
is the only adequate remedy. 66 The North Carolina court has never
squarely refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate future disputes,
but it has indicated by dicta that it would not do so. 6 7 The harsh com-
mon law rule of revocability, however, has been softened in its appli-
01 See footnote 51, supra.
' Must be a resident of Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, or Alabama, but
not a resident of six named counties near plant. AGREEMENT, DEBONAm FULL-
FASHIONED MILLS, INC. AND AMERICAN FEDERATION OF HOSIERY WORKERS (Cleve-
land, Tenn., Nov. 18, 1948) p. 14. Shall not reside within 100 miles of plant.
AGREEMENT, AMERICAN ENxA CoRP. AND UTWA-AFL (Asheville, N. C., May 26,
1950) Art. VI (E) (6), p. 11.
"3Most members of the panel are widely used in the South by the American
Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, or, both.
0" All are white males. This does not seem to be solely a regional manifesta-
tion. The National Academy of Arbitrators reportedly has no Negro and only
two women members.
" One is a minister. None are merchants or businessmen. Three of the four
practicing attorneys are not known to have done any arbitration, and are not on
other panels. However, seven of the fifteen professors on the panel are teachers
of law and are among the most active arbitrators. See N. C. DEP'T OF LABOR, VOL-
UNTARY ARBITRATION: A SERVICE TO INDUSTRY AND LABOR 1-4 (1951). Attorneys
do appear for one or both of the parties in a large percentage of the cases in
the region. Cf. McDonald, The Selection and Tenure of Arbitrators in Labor
Disputes, 1ST NYU ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 145, 149 (1948) indicating that lawyers
dominate the field of labor arbitration in the New York City area; Warren and
Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 IND. & LAB. RE. REV. 200, 205
(1951) showing a union preference for professors as compared with attorneys, and
an exactly contra employer choice. Holmes foresaw the ideal lawyer of the future
as "the man of statistics and the master of economics." HOLMES, COLL. LEG.
PAPERS 187 (1920).
It may be that the local non-utilization of practicing attorneys as arbitrators has
historical roots. Cf. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 122, 211-239
(1911) for vigorously expressed anti-lawyer sentiment among farmers, especially
in the western part of the State. The Laws of 1801 provided that "no attorney
should be allowed to speak or admitted [sic] as counsel" before the then Supreme
Court. Gilliam v. Saunders, 204 N. C. 206, 208, 167 S. E. 799, 800 (1933).
Another facet of this sentiment was that laymen were appointed appellate judges,
including John Williams, J., an "unlettered" carpenter. Battle, History of the
Supreme Court, 103 N. C. 445, 470 (1889).
00 Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 316 Mass. 631, 56 N. E. 2d 1 (1944) (specific
performance necessary to give members benefit of check-off provision of union
contract). Most of the applicable statutes authorize the court, inter alia, to direct
the parties to comply with the arbitration agreement. See Coo's CASES ON
EgurTy 456-462 (4th ed. 1948).
0 See cases in footnote 17, supra.
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cation and exceptions have been made to it.O8 In equity the particular
circumstances have been taken into account and the right to revoke
"this solemn agreement" has been made something less than an absolute
right.69 There have been intimations that the common law rule might
not be followed, but in the cases so hinting, the issue was not squarely
presented. 70 The facts in several holdings in which the court talked
about the danger of being ousted of its jurisdiction involved individual
plaintiffs who had agreed to arbitration by appointees of overpoweirng
organizations. 71 In any event, to regard common law revocability as
applying to agreements to arbitrate labor disputes is to invite the under-
mining of good labor relations in the plant.
7 2
As has been seen, the 1951 revision73 of the North Carolina labor
arbitration act makes agreements to arbitrate future labor disputes
irrevocable and enforceable. This integrates into the law the require-
ments and practices of daily labor relationships. Commendable improve-
ments were made in various details of arbitration procedure. §95-36.9(a)
provides for securing a stay prior to answer or demurrer in any court
action pending "upon any issue referable to arbitration." However,
§95-36.9(b) (c) is open to question. It authorizes a court stay of the
arbitration proceedings on the ground that there has been no agreement
to arbitrate the controversy involved, if application is made within ten
days after notice of the issue. And it authorizes a court stay of the
arbitration award on the ground that it exceeds the arbitrator's au-
thority, if application is made within ten days after notice of the award.
Failure to apply for a stay does not preclude raising the issue before
the arbitrator or in enforcement proceedings, as the case may be. The
"' The determination of a single fact or the amount of loss, as in insurance
appraisal, is not against public policy. Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance
Co., 106 N. C. 28, 10 S. E. 1057 (1890). See Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911) ; Braddy v. N. Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 115 N.
C. 354, 20 S. E. 477 (1894).
"Despite the common law rule, "... in a court of equity ... the breaching of
this solemn agreement [to arbitrate] will be considered as a strong circumstance,
with other evidence, as to the right of the party who breached the agreement to
have a receiver appointed." Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137 S. E. 869
(1927.)
7' Hargett v. Delisle, 229 N. C. 384, 49 S. E. 2d 739 (1948) ; Cox v. Hinshaw,
228 N. C. 102, 44 S. E. 2d 532 (1947); Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137
S. E. 869 (1927) ; Long v. Cromer, 181 N. C. 354, 107 S. E. 217 (1921) ; Wynne
v. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co., 179 N. C. 320, 102 S. E. 403 (1920) ; Pretz-
felder & Co. v. Merchants Ins. Co., 116 N. C. 491, 21 S. E. 302 (1895) ; Islay v.
Stewart, 20 N. C. 297 (1838) ; Williams v. Wood, 12 N. C. 82, 88 (1826) (opinion
of Taylor, C.J.).
"Kelly v. Trimont Lodge, 154 N. C. 97, 69 S. E. 764 (1910); Nelson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911) ; s. c., 167 N. C.
185, 83 S. E. 322 (1914) (see Clark, C. J., dissenting opinion).
"' See concurring opinion of Wolfe, J. in Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108
Utah 364, 160 P. 2d 421 (1945) ; Note, 28 N. C. L. Rav. 225, 228 (1950).
13 C. 1103, 1951 N. C. Sess. Laws (§§95-36.1 to 95-36.10).
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ten day limits are in keeping with the need for promptness. But will not
the stay provisions operate to encourage court tests of arbitrability of
issues, rather than, as heretofore, to leave arbitrability to be determined
by men experienced in labor relations and functioning in a tribunal gov-
erned by the contract of the interested parties ?74 Moreover, why resort
in such a hurry to a stay order, if the question of authority can be
litigated at the enforcement stages?
A recent U. S. District Court decision in North Carolina75 upholds
the injunctive enforcement of agreements to arbitrate labor disputes
under §301 of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act.7 6 This is
based on a liberal construction of that statute as creating a new federal
substantive right, independent of state law. It is supported by two U. S.
Court of Appeals decisions.77 Another device to effectuate the arbitra-
tion agreement, avoiding the common law doctrine of revocability and
equity's tight adherence thereto, is the declaratory judgment.78 A
court's declaration in construing the agreement that the defendant is
under a duty to arbitrate might get results without coercive relief. If
that were needed, it could be supplied later. One potential lever, of
course, is the resort to economic weapons.
79
" The question of the arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority is often a pre-
liminary issue at the hearing. For recent examples of such arbitration cases in
North Carolina, see In re A. D. Julliard & Co., 15 L. A. 934 (1951) ; In re Cale-
donia Mills, Inc., 15 L. A. 474 (1950) ; In re Aleo Mfg. Co., 15 L. A. 715 (1950).
The latter award was later subject to litigation in the case cited in footnote 75,
infra. Few contracts specifically anticipate the right of the parties to go into
court later, as does that in AGREEMENT, THOMAS CAR WORKS, INC. AND UNITED
AUTo WORKERS, CIO (High Point, N. C., Feb. 15, 1949) Art. VI, p. 11, where
the arbitration decision is "final and binding . . . provided that full legal rights
of the parties in the courts shall not be restricted in any way."
"' Textile Workers Union of America v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.
D., N. C. 1950). Another local complaint has been filed to enforce a collective
bargaining contract, including its arbitration provisions. Raleigh (N. C.) News &
Observer, April 12, 1951, §2, p. 29, col. 6.
" 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
'17 Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.
1950); American Fed. of Labor v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 179 F. 2d 535
(6th Cir. 1950).
" Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Texoma Natural Gas Co., 146 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir.
1944) ; Textile Workers Union of America v. Aleo. Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626
(M. D., N. C. 1950); Northland Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n,
66 F. Supp. 431 (1946).
7" This is succinctly stated in some contracts. "As to any dispute subject to
arbitration, the Union agrees that it will not authorize or support any strike....
As to any dispute not subject to arbitration, the Company agrees that the Union
. ..shall have the right to strike. . . ." AGREEMAENT, A. D. JUILLIARD & Co. AND
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AmERICA, CIO (Brookford, N. C., April 14, 1949)
§XV(a) (b), p. 24. On enforcement of awards, the hint of potential economic
force is sometimes equally clear. "Union reserves the right to strike if the
Company fails to carry out the decision of the Arbitrator within 10 days after
receipt of his decision in writing; the Company reserves the right to lockout... :'
AGREEMENT. PowELL KNITTING CO. AND AMERICAN FEDERATION OF Hosim£y
WORKERS (Spartanburg, S. C., Sept. 1, 1949) Art. X, p. 16.
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What will be the scope of judicial review of labor arbitration awards
under the new North Carolina statute? It contemplates two grounds :80
arbitrability and the arbitrator's authority. The Thoma.sville Chair
case,81 which preceded the statute, involved only the latter. The Uni-
form Act codifies the usual common law grounds:82 charges of bias,
corruption, denial of due process and lack of authority, but, it is not
directly applicable to labor arbitration. Perhaps the grounds mentioned
would be available as at common law, as they are not excluded by the
new act. Traditionally, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court
has been liberal in sustaining arbitration awards and hearing pro-
cedures.8 3
M. H. Ross.
Labor Law-Unemployment Compensation-Geographical Scope
of Labor Dispute Disqualification
Due to a shortage of parts, which was caused by a strike of the
United Auto Workers-C.I.O. local in Dearborn, Michigan, the Ford
Motor Company closed its assembly plants throughout the country.
These assembly plant employees, members of the U.A.W.-C.I.O., but
of different locals, filed claims for unemployment compensation in at
least four states.- From commission decisions allowing the claims,
so §95-36.9(c) of c. 1103, 1951 N. C. Sess. Laws.
"1Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 233 N. C.
46, 62 S. E. 2d 535 (1950). In reviewing the scope of the arbitrator's authority,
the narrow common law attitude toward the role of compromise, as expressed in
Cutler v. Cutler, 169 N. C. 482, 86 S. E. 301 (1915), would hardly apply to labor
disputes. This may be expressly set out in the contract. The arbitrator "is not
bound to render a 'Yes' or 'No' decision." AGREEMENT, HILLCREST HosimvY MILLS
AND AMERica FDERATi ON OF HOsIERY WORK ES (Durham, N. C., Mar. 12, 1949)
§3 (b), p. 7.
'IN. C. GENr. STAT. §1-559 (1943). See UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, ARiTRATION
OF LABOR DIsptrEs 126-28 (1946).
"Bryson v. Higdon, 222 N. C. 17, 21 S. E. 2d 836 (1942). "Anciently, the
construction of awards often turned on nice and subtle distinctions, and much
refinement . . . but a more liberal and sensible method has been introduced, and
the judges have invariably laid it down that the courts will intend everything
to support the awards. . . ." Clark Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire In-
surance Co., 160 N. C. 130, 139, 75 S. E. 944, 948 (1912). "There is no right of
appeal, and this court has no power to revise the decision of judges who are
of the parties' own choosing. An award is intended to settle the matter in con-
troversy and thus save the expense of litigation. If a mistake be a sufficient ground
for setting aside an award it opens the door for coming into court in almost every
case .. . and arbitration instead of ending would tend to increase and encourage
litigation." Eaton v. Eaton, 43 N. C. 102, 105 (1851).
' Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Virginia.
For discussion of disqualification due to a labor dispute in general see, 17 U.
OF CaICAGO L. RxZv. 294 (1950); 49 CoL. L. REV. 550 (1949); 33 MINN. L. Rv.
758 (1949); 49 YA.iF L. J. 461 (1940); 55 YALE L. J. 167 (1945). See also
49 MIcH. L. Rav. 886 (1951) for discussion of the "Effect of the Merits of ,
Labor Dispute on the Right to Benefits."
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